The executive has finally relented. The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, has been repealed and replaced by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026.

With the growth of population in the country, litigation increased. All courts, including high courts, started experiencing increased pendency. Backlog became a problem requiring national attention. In 1969, the Shah Commission was set up by the central government for expeditious disposal of service disputes of government servants, which formed a high percentage of the backlog. It recommended establishing an independent tribunal.

The seriousness of the situation led to the establishment of an administrative reforms commission in quick succession, which recommended civil services tribunals to decide appeals of government servants in disciplinary cases. In 1976, the 42nd constitutional amendment was made. Part XIV-A was inserted into the Constitution, comprising Articles 323A and 323B, authorising the setting up of administrative tribunals. Yet the matter languished. Finally, the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, came into effect on November 1, 1985. Thus, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) came into being.

Over time, many other tribunals have been established under Article 323B—tax, industrial disputes, election, and rent tribunals. The avowed purpose was reducing backlog in courts. Thus, the jurisdiction of high courts under Articles 226/227 regarding these matters was taken away, and even the Supreme Court was deprived of its jurisdiction under Article 32.

Litigation ensued, starting with SP Sampath Kumar (1987). A five-judge Supreme Court bench propagated the principle of a “substitute institutional mechanism” for Articles 226 and 227 and upheld denuding the high courts’ jurisdiction. This was reversed by a seven-judge constitution bench in L Chandra Kumar vs Union of India (1997) case, which invoked the basic structure doctrine to hold that judicial review by the high courts under Articles 226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 cannot be abolished, ruling that tribunals act as supplements to the high courts rather than substitutes for them.

Subverting the Bench

However, the Supreme Court did not dilute its view regarding the independence of tribunals. Their judgments must be respected and implemented like high court judgments. The selection process must give the judiciary a predominant role. Chairpersons and members must enjoy the status of chief justices and judges of high courts, with terms attracting the best talent to inspire litigant confidence.

This dictum was reinforced over three decades of litigation. Yet the legislature repeatedly enacted statutes containing the very same provisions frowned upon by the highest court. Why? The only plausible reason is that the government wanted to subvert the tribunals to obtain favourable decisions and protect its policies from being declared illegal. It forgot that democracy functions by the rule of law—else it degenerates into autocracy.

Good sense appears to have dawned with the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026. Concerns regarding selection, appointment, tenure, and independence have largely been addressed. Salaries and allowances will be as ordained in the rules to be framed, and hopefully they too will align with Supreme Court law to attract top talent and ensure true independence.

Escaping the maze

Moving forward, proper infrastructure and facilities are the logical next step. Without adequate infrastructure, tribunals cannot function effectively, amounting to a denial of judicial review. As specialised entities supplementing high courts, they are expected to act quickly and efficiently. Ideally, there should be no pendency in tribunals, but this requires minimum requisite facilities, adequate staffing, and minimal vacancies. They cannot fulfil their purpose operating from makeshift buildings and temporary accommodation. Hopefully, the National Tribunals Commission will reduce existing shortcomings.

Another crucial aspect is interference by high courts. At present, high courts treat tribunals like inferior courts. Orders rejecting stale claims are interfered with, and minor procedural infractions attract their ire. Litigants approach high courts merely to seek review or expedite hearings, and high courts readily oblige.

A stark illustration is a matter dismissed as barred by limitation, where reasons given for condonation of delay were not germane. The high court remanded the case with directions to issue notice, frame issues, permit evidence, and then decide limitation. A tribunal was directed to follow the Code of Civil Procedure, even though it is entitled to regulate its own procedure and is not bound by the code.

L Chandra Kumar laid down that only a division bench of the high court will hear petitions challenging tribunal orders. This implies that only constitutional issues and important questions of law should engage high courts. The principles of certiorari jurisdiction must be strictly followed so tribunals can perform efficient disposal—else backlog will never be tackled.

Half a century has gone by in this exercise with no tangible results. We must not let the experiment fail, and success will be achieved if we act in unison toward the common goal. Abhimanyu must be enabled to emerge victorious from the vv for the good of the nation.